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ABSTRACT 
 
The Civilian Battle Damage Assessment Ratio (CBDAR) is a method for assessing and tracking 
proportional patterns of civilian casualties from combat.  CBDARs can be applied by both military 
forces and humanitarian organisations towards the common goal of minimising the civilian impact of 
conflict.  These ratios complement absolute numbers on casualties, are easily integrated into 
existing assessment systems, and can track proportions of civilians, women, or children among 
casualties.  The ratios can be used for monitoring, and to make comparisons between time periods, 
geographic areas, combatant forces, and between weapons, tactics or rules of engagement.  
Though applicable to civilian casualty monitoring in any armed conflict, we introduce the CBDAR 
with a specific description of how it can be applied to Commander International Security Assistance 
Force‟s (COMISAF) Tactical Directive to minimise civilian casualties in Afghanistan. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tracking Civilian Casualties under COMISAF’s Tactical Directive.  The aim of this paper is to 
offer NATO, military forces generally, and the humanitarian community a common approach for 
monitoring civilian casualties in conflict zones through the use of Civilian Battle Damage 
Assessment Ratios (CBDAR).  As we will describe, CBDARs can guide the collection of evidence 
and data on civilian casualties; they can identify proportional patterns within absolute numbers of 
civilian casualties, which can be used in assessment and to decrease future casualties; and they 
can track combat effects on civilian populations that are of particular humanitarian concern, such as 
women and children.  The CBDAR process can also be useful in tracking civilian casualties for 
compensation purposes and for assessing the public health impact and economic costs of civilian 
morbidity and mortality.   As pertains to NATO, the CBDAR has an explicit focus on civilian casualty 
tracking that corresponds to the recent, revised Tactical Directive4.  We link CBDARs directly to 
existing military monitoring systems, such as the British Army‟s Planning Cycle and Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA) / After Action Review processes, so that the method can be efficiently integrated 
into current systems.  This should facilitate the use of CBDARs in monitoring by, for example, the 
ISAF Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell which began to standardise civilian casualty tracking in 
Afghanistan in August 2008, to complement its current tracking methods5.  
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The critical importance of minimising and monitoring civilian casualties in the Afghan theatre of 
operations is emphasized in the Commander International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 
Tactical Directive on 30 December 20086, and publically announced on January 14, 20094.  The 
CBDAR process described in this paper addresses an overall goal of the new Tactical Directive – 
“To minimise the risk of harming civilians” – as well as addressing the following specific components 
of the directive:  
 
•  To demonstrate proportionality, restraint, and utmost discrimination in the use of firepower; 
 
•  To acknowledge civilian casualties immediately and transparently investigate allegations rapidly; 
 
•  To ensure a common approach is taken across the country; 
 
•  To establish a transparent methodology of civilian casualty reporting, COMISAF: 
 
o Establish a civilian casualties tracking cell monitoring incidents; 
 
o Systemise recording of allegations as well as resulting rebuttals and admissions; 
 
o Develop a two-tiered system of checking the validity of an allegation and conducting the 
actual investigation if the allegation was substantiated; 
 
o Enhance battle-damage assessments at Regional Command level; 
 
o Define modalities for improved ISAF HQ interaction with UNAMA (United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan) and other national and international organizations on casualty reporting. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Why track casualties?  In Afghanistan, civilian casualties (i.e. injuries or deaths) have been of 
major concern to NATO military forces, to Afghanistan‟s citizens and government, and to local and 
international humanitarian organisations.  Recent publications have highlighted numbers of civilian 
casualties sustained in Afghanistan during 20087,8,9,10,11, nearly all of which have captured headlines 
and generated widespread international concern12,13.  These reports assist in informing protagonists 
in war of their responsibility to minimise civilian14 suffering in accordance with International 
Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict15.   
 
Although tracking casualties is not routine to all military forces, it is routine to the British Army, which 
monitors all the casualties that are treated by its medical personnel in its medical system.  This is 
done for a number of reasons, not least of which is that the use of scarce health care resources and 
related opportunity costs are a perennial concern to civilian health care managers and Army medical 
commanders alike.  An epidemiological approach to systematically monitor, react and apply 
capability to where it is most likely required is a well trodden and proven path ever since its first 
application in 185416.  Thus like their civilian counterparts, military health care commanders manage 
their resources in an evidence-based manner17.  This approach of tracking military casualties 
extends to all people treated by the British Army‟s health care professionals18 as not only does the 
British Army recognise this as the moral19 and legally20 responsible thing to do, but it also allows the 
British Army to help organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 
the tracking of civilian casualties for next of kin purposes.  This system of tracking civilian and 
military casualties treated by British Army health care professionals does not, however, include 
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injuries or deaths of civilians who have not entered the British Army medical treatment system.  
Likewise the British Army‟s medical system does not monitor or report on deaths as this is 
considered an administrative responsibility.  It is for the above reasons that a more complete and 
systematic system for tracking all civilian casualties is needed. 
 
In addition to the basic imperative to minimize civilian harm, asserted by both humanitarian 
principles and laws of war, and the need to assess health care needs, there are other reasons for 
assiduous casualty tracking by military forces.  Civilian morbidity and mortality caused by conflict 
has a negative impact on security and confidence in the indigenous authority.  In Afghanistan, both 
the Afghan authority and NATO forces are concerned that civilian injuries and deaths may be 
exploited in the media by insurgent forces.  This statement by President Hamid Karzai on 26 April 
2008 goes to the root of the civilian casualties issue: 
 
‗I am not happy with civilian casualties coming down; I want an end to civilian casualties… As much 
as one may argue it‘s difficult, I don‘t accept that argument… It seriously undermines our efforts to 
have an effective campaign against terrorism.‘ 
 
Civilian casualties negatively affect the „will of the people‟ and where clusters of casualties occur 
over a sustained period of time – the battle may well be lost without a military defeat, as we will 
discuss below in terms of destabilisation effects.  The British Army‟s Counter Insurgency Operations 
(COIN) doctrinal publication21 clearly articulates the importance of this issue.  In 2008 HQ ISAF and 
US forces in Afghanistan commenced tracking civilian casualties, as reported by UNAMA7: 
 
‗ISAF also introduced a centralised civilian casualties tracking cell that is mirrored within US Forces 
Afghanistan by a similar tracking cell, aimed at investigating all claims of civilian casualties attributed 
to ISAF/US Forces Afghanistan. International military forces showed themselves more willing than 
before to institute more regular and transparent inquiries into specific incidents (although the 
independence of these inquiries is still questionable).‘ 
 
Given that military actors and humanitarian monitors seek the same end – a true reflection of the 
impact of conflict on civilians – we argue that the most mutually beneficial and most accurate 
solution is to pool resources, sources of information and expertise to provide a definitive, agreed 
casualty account.  Working together (akin to the humanitarian system‟s „Cluster Approach‟22) would 
foster closer relations and a better understanding of respective positions, would ensure impartial, 
credible, independent and accurate reporting of incidents in order to record and reduce the impact 
of conflict on civilians, and has been requested by 11 NGOs working in Afghanistan23.  Coordinated 
military, indigenous authority, and NGO civilian casualty tracking is analogous to the current working 
relationship that supports humanitarian responses to respond to natural disasters and armed 
conflict.  As described by Michael Meyer, head of international law at the British Red Cross:  ―The 
relationship between the Red Cross and the Armed Forces is nothing short of fundamental”24.  We 
suggest that coordinated civilian casualty tracking should be done in all armed conflicts, and that 
civilian casualties should be reported in both crude absolute numbers and in CBDARs which show 
the proportional representation of civilians, women and children among casualties.  
 
THE CIVILIAN BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT RATIO (CBDAR) 
 
Calculation and Origin of CBDARS.  As in most reports of civilian harm from war, civilian injuries 
and deaths in Afghanistan have generally been reported as absolute numbers (e.g. 2118 deaths in 
2008).  Although absolute numbers of casualties are an essential basis of recording civilian harm, 
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these absolute counts are accompanied by little in the way of proportional analysis for patterns.  
This limits their utility and scope of interpretation.  For example, UNAMA reports7: 
 
‗UNAMA Human Rights recorded a total of 2118 civilian casualties between 01 
January and 31 December 2008. This figure represents an increase of almost 40% 
on the 1523 civilian deaths recorded in the year of 2007. The 2008 civilian death 
toll is thus the highest of any year since the end of major hostilities which resulted 
in the demise of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001.‘ 
 
Similarly, NATO/ISAF provides data for a diagram showing monthly counts of civilian deaths, with 
an analysis of the proportions of total civilian deaths attributable to different types of ISAF/OEF 
events5.  Both UNAMA7 and NATO/ISAF5 carried out proportional analysis to report the % of 
civilians who were killed by ISAF/OEF forces (or „pro-government forces‟ as reported by UNAMA) as 
compared to the % killed by insurgent forces.   
 
We suggest that reports of civilian casualties would be much more informative and useful if they 
routinely and systematically included analysis for the following three proportional civilian outcomes, 
or CBDARs:   
 
Civilian  Battle Damage Assessment Ratio Example Calculation 
Numerator/Denominator 
% civilians among total deaths 
 
No. civilian deaths/Total no. civilian and 
opposition combatant deaths 
% women among civilian deaths No. women deaths/Total no. civilian deaths 
% children among civilian deaths No. child deaths/Total no. civilian deaths 
 
The CBDAR approach emphasising the use of proportional analysis builds upon the „Dirty War 
Index (DWI)25‟, a data-driven public health tool based on laws of war that systematically identifies 
rates of particularly undesirable or prohibited, i.e. „dirty‟, war outcomes sustained by populations 
during armed conflict (e.g. civilian death, child injury or torture).  Dirty War Indices (DWIs) are 
explicitly linked to international humanitarian law to make public health outcomes directly relevant to 
prevention, monitoring and humanitarian intervention to moderate war‟s effects.  CBDAR 
calculations are carried out in the same way as DWIs and share the same basis of respect for 
international humanitarian law.  As described for the DWI, and in an analysis of the effects of 
different weapon-types in Iraq26, measuring the proportions of civilians, women, females or children 
among those killed by actions or by weapons can provide quantitative indicators of relatively 
indiscriminate or disproportionate force.   For example, the % of child casualties can be an indicator 
of a weapon‟s or a tactic‟s indiscriminateness, as children are not targeted.  Monitoring civilian, 
woman or child CBDARs can be useful in meeting the Tactical Directive requirement, “To 
demonstrate proportionality, restraint, and utmost discrimination in the use of firepower‖4.  CBDAR 
findings can provide quantitative evidence to support tactical and strategic decisions to refrain from 
use of weapon-types that are shown to produce, for example, relatively high proportions of child 
casualties. Minimising use of such weapon-types can prevent child casualties in future actions and 
minimize the risk of harming civilians.   
 
The CBDAR differs from the DWI in its terminology, which fits more productively with military 
psychology and language.  The CBDAR also differs from the DWI in its direct linkage to existing 
military monitoring systems, particularly Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).  The British Army 
currently assesses all its activities through the lens of the effects-based approach27 informed by 
good military judgement28 – „Have we achieved our desired effect?‟.  This process conducts a Battle 
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Damage Assessment which is usually part of the intelligence and effects assessments team‟s 
responsibilities.  The current system is primarily reliant on military evidence (photographs, satellite 
imagery and troop reports) as this is known, factual and first-hand account evidence.  Where 
possible enemy and civilian casualties and deaths may be included in these reports and 
occasionally medical staff officers may be sought to corroborate any civilian morbidity or mortality 
figures through contacts in the civilian health services (Provincial Ministers of Health, hospital 
admission records, etc.).  This is not conducted as a routine activity nor is it part of the formal BDA 
system.  Given the new and ever-evolving nature of the modern battlefield (Hybrid Warfare29 derived 
from concepts such as the US 3 Block War30 or the British Contemporary Operating Environment) 
and the importance of winning the battle for the will of the people31 we would propose that 
surveillance, monitoring and assessment of the impact of civilian casualties to military operations 
should be routinely conducted by integrating CBDARs into the BDA system.   
 
As discussed by Hicks and Spagat,25 accurate data are essential to provide clear and valid results 
that will inform all actors in the conflict environment.  Potential sources of bias in casualty data need 
to be recognised and addressed through careful choice of valid CBDAR measurements and 
accurate data sources that, ideally, can be corroborated.  For example, some conflicts, such as in 
Afghanistan, involve one or more military forces that do not wear uniforms to distinguish themselves 
from civilians.  This is a humanitarian violation that increases risk to civilians during combat, and it 
complicates distinguishing civilian from combatant casualties in the aftermath of combat.  
Cooperative assessment of civilian casualties by the military, NGOs and indigenous authorities may 
be crucial to provide credible civilian casualty tracking in this situation.  Cooperative civilian casualty 
tracking that involves pooled, corroborated information from multiple actors can also compensate for 
possible bias that can occur if one actor has incomplete information.  For example, it is unknown 
whether limited direct physical access by UNAMA7 to the insecure provinces of Afghanistan may 
have biased UNAMA estimates of civilian deaths in those provinces, where they had to rely on 
secondary rather than primary sources of information, despite every effort to compile 
comprehensive data.  If ISAF/OEF military actors mutually compiled civilian casualty data with 
humanitarian groups such as UNAMA, and with indigenous authorities, the substantially more 
complete and corroborated data could compensate for gaps in the data of any one group. 
 
Collection of Evidence through the CBDAR Collection Loop.  The collection of evidence is 
exceedingly important and must be conducted as accurately as possible.  But if well considered 
actors in this field such as UNAMA, ICRC and Human Rights Watch all describe difficulties in the 
collection of the evidence is there a uniform process or systems that can be considered for use?  
Mirsad Tokača, founder and President of the Research and Documentation Centre32 of Sarajevo 
has conducted a systematic review of all deaths caused by the conflict in the Balkans.  He has 
placed all known individuals (up to 99% accuracy) who have either disappeared or died in the 
conflict to a GPS referenced database that links documentation and evidence to each person‟s file. 
This process provides a „human face‟ to each death to go beyond data analysis into evidence 
analysis; hence we offer this process as the collection of evidence as well as the collection of data.  
This systematic and detailed approach we call the Civilian Battle Damage Assessment Ratio 
Collection Loop (CBDAR Collection Loop).  The CBDAR Collection Loop in Figure 1.1 is a 
suggested process that identifies the sources of information required to conduct CBDAR analysis.  
Figure 1.1 is not exhaustive but we recommend it as the minimum number of sources advisable to 
conduct CBDAR analysis.  As suggested above, a collaborative, multi-agency approach to the 
analysis will reduce inaccurate identification issues, bias, error and questions over independence or 
credibility.  The Bosnian casualty database provides an electronic solution that could be used now 
by all militaries, GOs, IOs and NGOs that meets the CBDAR information requirement and is geo-
spatially linked with Google Earth™ so that real time mapping of incidents can be created and 
evidence collected. 
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Figure 1.1 – Civilian Battle Damage Assessment Ratio Collection Loop 
Key – MoPH = Ministry of Public Health, Sect = Section, Pltn = Platoon, Coy = Company, BG = 
Battle Group, Bde = Brigade, Div = Division, J2 = Military Intelligence, J3 = Military Operations. 
 
Often the immediate military imperative is to provide as best an understanding of each incident as 
quickly as possible, not only to determine whether the military effect has been achieved but also to 
win the information battle and to inform the Battle Damage Assessment process.  This may not be 
ideal for the accurate and detailed analysis that is suggested for the CBDAR Collection Loop 
process. However, both should be completed in hours, complement each other and where 
information is unavailable, CBDAR Collection Loop plans should be articulated and initiated to be 
completed in a specified timeframe.  In the modern battlefield where multiple „troops in contact‟ (TIC) 
incidents overlap and interlock on an hourly basis over a geographic area measuring in the 
hundreds of square kilometres, a detailed electronic database should be maintained for each TIC 
even when no civilian deaths are identified.  As with the Bosnian example cited above, mapping the 
location of every civilian death to the causes of conflict will over time provide all actors a picture on 
how conflict has affected communities and potentially, infrastructure.  The more a community is 
affected by conflict the less confidence they may have in their Government and its ability to maintain 
stability; therefore it is in the military‟s interest to map every civilian death and, where possible, 
injury.  Up-to-date mapping that is considered during operational and tactical planning stages may 
well alter the Commander‟s decision, as in the modern battlefield it is more the will of the people that 
is being fought for rather than solely the destruction of the enemy.  Thus a „mowing the lawn‟33 
approach may well be detrimental to the overall campaign.  Such mapping when married to existing 
military34, governmental organisations35 and humanitarian36 publications will also provide guidance 
to humanitarian, reconstruction, compensation and development actors by informing them as to 
which communities have been most affected and therefore may be the most in need. 
 
The CBDAR Cycle.  The suggested CBDAR cycle at Figure 1.2 places the impact of civilian deaths 
within the military planning, execution and review contexts.  When CBDAR analysis is implemented, 
= Stored Data   = Collate      = Data        = Decision 
Incident 
Occurs 
CBDAR 
Analysis 
J3 Incident Log 
Books (Coy, BG, 
Bde, Div) 
Patrol Reports 
(Sect, Pltn, Coy) 
J2 Initial Analysis 
(Incident mapping, 
weekly area activity) 
Hospital 
Admissions Data 
NGO & IO Incident 
Reports (UNAMA, 
AIHRC, CIVIC, HRW) 
Media Incident 
Reports 
Enemy Media 
Statements 
Firsthand accounts/ 
Village elder reports 
Win the Info Media Battle 
Inform Influence Activity 
Weapon Effects Analysis 
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we believe that it will contribute to reducing overall civilian mortality from combat involving military 
forces that abide by international humanitarian law and that value civilian lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Civilian Battle Damage Assessment Ratio Cycle. 
 
Applications of the CBDAR.  To elaborate on the applications described earlier, there are three 
ways that the CBDAR analytical process can be used in military analysis.  These are Period Review, 
Kinetic37 Analysis and Destabilisation Analysis.  The following hypothetical examples use a CBDAR 
that gives the proportion of civilian deaths among total civilian and opposition combatant deaths.  
 
Period Review is used to measure a protagonist‟s civilian mortality incidents over periods of time.  It 
provides a ratio value up to 100%; the higher the figure the more likely that the protagonist can be 
said to be indiscriminately using force and or deliberately targeting civilian populations.  Conversely, 
the lower a value, the more careful and „surgical‟ the protagonist is in the use of force, with the 
lowest possible value being 0% civilian casualties.  Period Review should be used to indicate trends 
when comparing different periods.  Military forces in the field should consider CBDAR figures on a 
monthly basis and annually.  Annual analysis could be conducted with the various humanitarian 
rights organisations which will ensure that as close to an agreed interpretation can be reached.  
Period Review could also be conducted between geographical regions or between troop-
contributing nations to compare or indicate differences in approach and rules of engagement38.  
Table 1.1 provides a hypothetical example for a regional monthly CBDAR analysis.  Differences 
between Provinces are exposed in that Province 2 is highly kinetic causing significant mortality to 
civilians and protagonists alike whereas in Province 6 combat occurs but in a very surgical manner 
by both sides.  Equally in this example, human rights monitoring organisations would be very 
concerned that insurgents appear to be targeting civilians in 5 out of the 6 Provinces and through 
such analysis apply pressure on Government Forces especially in Provinces 1 & 2 to reduce civilian 
mortality.   
 
 
Military Effects 
Based Planning & 
Targeting 
Input CBDAR 
weapons analysis 
& Civilian 
Mortality Mapping 
J3 Decision 
on Kinetic 
Option 
Incident 
Occurs 
Commander‟s 
After Action 
Review 
J2 Led Battle Damage 
Assessment, Effects 
Assessment & CBDAR 
Analysis Process 
Update CBDAR 
weapons analysis 
& Civilian 
Mortality Mapping 
CBDAR Cycle 
= Process   = Direct Access Storage      = Decision 
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MONTHLY REGIONAL CBDAR ANALYSIS 
 
       
Regional Analysis Forces Civilians Killed 
Opposing Forces 
Killed Total Killed CBDAR 
 Province 1 Government Forces 26 99 125 21% 
 Insurgents 40 12 52 77% 
 Province 2 Government Forces 81 176 257 32% 
 Insurgents 210 22 232 91% 
 Province 3 Government Forces 2 23 25 8% 
 Insurgents 7 1 8 88% 
 Province 4 Government Forces 0 0 0 0% 
 Insurgents 0 0 0 0% 
 Province 5 Government Forces 3 34 37 8% 
 Insurgents 19 3 22 86% 
 Province 6 Government Forces 0 24 24 0% 
 Insurgents 15 0 15 100% 
 Whole Region Government Forces 112 356 468 24% 
 Insurgents 291 38 329 88% 
   
 
403 394 797 51% 
Destabilising 
Effect 
  
  
Total Civilians 
Killed 
Total Combatants 
Killed Total Deaths   
   
Table 1.1 – Hypothetical Monthly Regional CBDAR Analysis. 
 
To the civilian, it is almost irrelevant who caused a death as any death has a destabilising effect and 
the impression that law and order and governmental control has been lost.  Any figure in this column 
has a destabilising effect, but clearly, the higher the % CBDAR for civilians among the dead, the 
more likely that the will of the people may be being lost, even though in attritional terms Government 
Forces may be winning the Tactical and Operational physical battles against the insurgent.  The 
destabilising effect ratio is just one part of an overall destabilisation analysis; were civilian conflict 
related morbidity to also be included a total conflict related violence resulting in injury or death 
analysis could occur.  Similarly, issues of intimidation (e.g. „night letters‟ - written threats left by the 
Taliban under cover of darkness), governance, corruption, rule of law, access to healthcare, access 
to education and employment opportunities can each have their own destabilising effect. 
 
Kinetic Analysis is the continuous monitoring and review of civilian deaths caused by specific 
weapon systems.  When this analysis is introduced in military effects based planning phases, the 
civilian mortality effect can be assessed given the type of kinetic options being made available.  
Table 1.2 is a hypothetical monthly analysis of various weapon systems that may be employed by a 
military component.  This historically evidence-based analysis allows military commanders to 
consider what type of kinetic option to employ in order to reduce civilian mortality and morbidity25.  In 
the example below, there is no difference in military effect between the use of a 500lbs bomb and a 
2000lbs bomb, in terms of number of insurgent deaths, although there is a significant difference in 
the CBDAR proportional effect on civilians: a higher % of those killed by the 2000lbs bomb are 
civilians.  Logically, as both systems produce the same military effect the Commander should equip 
his Close Air Support (CAS) capability with 500lbs bombs in order to reduce the probability of 
civilian injury and death.  Equally, consideration should be given to the use of Multiple Launch 
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Rocket Systems (MLRS) as opposed to CAS given its greater military effect and lesser probability 
chance of civilian death39.  There should also be consistency between Table 1.1 and 1.2 – total 
civilian and combatant deaths must be the same as well as the monthly CBDAR figure for that 
month.  An area not covered in either table is attributing „blue on blue‟ (own force mortality and 
morbidity) probabilities to a weapon system.  
 
MONTHLY CBDAR KINETIC ANALYSIS 
     Weapon System Civilian Deaths Insurgent Deaths Total Deaths CBDAR 
Small Arms 2 18 20 10% 
81mm HE 9 60 69 13% 
105mm 11 25 36 31% 
155mm 11 25 36 31% 
MLRS 14 88 102 14% 
500lbs bomb 23 70 93 25% 
2000lbs bomb 42 70 112 38% 
  112 356 468 24% 
  Total Civilian Deaths Total Combatant Deaths     
  
Table 1.2 – Hypothetical Monthly CBDAR Kinetic Analysis. 
 
Destabilisation Analysis incorporates the period review analysis, incident mortality mapping (both 
previously discussed) and the cost of mortality and morbidity.  Economic models40 that identify the 
causes of conflict attempt to quantify the cost of conflict mainly at the macro-economic level and 
others such as Christopher Cramer41 and Frances Stewart42 attempt to consider more meso and 
micro-economic issues.  All, however, accept that conflict increases poverty.  The true cost to 
household members who have lost their main income provider or to an individual who suffers life-
long disability due to conflict is often difficult to quantify and should be assessed over a lifetime 
rather than a one-off payment.  Government and international43 forces all recognise the need for a 
simple compensation system44 to civilians affected by the conflict in Afghanistan which tend to be 
assessed on a one off payment pro-rata basis.  The Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY45) and 
Disability Adjusted Life-Year (DALY) approach to assessing the cost of healthcare has for some 
time been used by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence46 in the United Kingdom in assessing 
individual healthcare needs and related costs47.  A similar approach could be adopted to assess the 
level of compensation to be paid to civilians injured or to relatives who have lost a family member to 
conflict.  Whilst conceptually the academic and healthcare community understand and apply the 
QALY and DALY approaches in their respective states, in low income, conflict-affected fragile states 
a workable system has yet to be researched and internationally accepted.  Despite this, 
Destabilisation Analysis can and should still occur using period review analysis and incident 
mortality mapping whilst accepting the real cost of death or injury of civilians to the individual, family 
and society is not completely appreciated at this time.   
 
SUMMARY.  CBDAR analysis of civilian casualties enables a common systematic approach for 
military and humanitarian organisations alike.  Use of collaborative action, with pooling of actors‟ 
resources to develop a systematic evidence-based database that is geographically linked, enables 
actors to better understand the effects of conflict on civilians, as well as reducing bias in reporting 
and increasing awareness of the effects of conflict.  Period Review, Kinetic Analysis and 
Destabilisation Analysis combine to inform military actors of their obligations under International 
Humanitarian Law, of civilian mortality rates, of the civilian lethality probability of individual weapon 
systems and of the destabilising effect that civilian deaths may have in conflict.  The financial cost of 
civilian injury and death attributed to conflict needs to be researched and discussed further.  The 
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simplicity of the CBDAR approach allows all actors in conflict-affected states to at least consider its 
implementation (especially the military as it meets COMISAFs Tactical Directive for civilian casualty 
minimisation and monitoring).  It is a common approach towards tracking leading to reducing civilian 
deaths and injuries from conflict that must surely be in everyone‟s interests. 
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